Humans often have to modify the timing and/or type of their planned actions on the basis of new sensory information. In the present experiments, participants planned to make a right index finger keypress 3 s after a warning stimulus but on some trials were interrupted by a temporally unpredictable auditory tone prompting the same action (experiment 1) or a different action (experiment 2). In experiment 1, by comparing the reaction time (RT) to tones presented at different stages of the preparatory period to RT in a simple reaction time condition, we determined the cost of switching from an internally generated mode of response production to an externally triggered mode in situations requiring only a change in when an action is made (i.e., when the tone prompts the action at a different time from the intended time of action). Results showed that the cost occurred for interruption tones delivered 200 ms after a warning stimulus and remained relatively stable throughout most of the preparatory period with a reduction in the magnitude of the cost during the last 200 ms prior to the intended time of movement. In experiment 2, which included conditions requiring a change in both when and what action is produced on the tone, results show a larger cost when the switched to action is different from the action being prepared. We discuss our results in the light of neurophysiological experiments on motor preparation and suggest that intending to act is accompanied by a general inhibitory mechanism preventing premature motor output and a specific excitatory process pertaining to the intended movement. Interactions between these two mechanisms could account for our behavioral results.
Obhi SS, Matkovich S, Chen R. Changing the "when" and "what" of intended actions. J Neurophysiol 102: 2755 -2762 . First published August 26, 2009 doi:10.1152 /jn.00336.2009 . Humans often have to modify the timing and/or type of their planned actions on the basis of new sensory information. In the present experiments, participants planned to make a right index finger keypress 3 s after a warning stimulus but on some trials were interrupted by a temporally unpredictable auditory tone prompting the same action (experiment 1) or a different action (experiment 2). In experiment 1, by comparing the reaction time (RT) to tones presented at different stages of the preparatory period to RT in a simple reaction time condition, we determined the cost of switching from an internally generated mode of response production to an externally triggered mode in situations requiring only a change in when an action is made (i.e., when the tone prompts the action at a different time from the intended time of action). Results showed that the cost occurred for interruption tones delivered 200 ms after a warning stimulus and remained relatively stable throughout most of the preparatory period with a reduction in the magnitude of the cost during the last 200 ms prior to the intended time of movement. In experiment 2, which included conditions requiring a change in both when and what action is produced on the tone, results show a larger cost when the switched to action is different from the action being prepared. We discuss our results in the light of neurophysiological experiments on motor preparation and suggest that intending to act is accompanied by a general inhibitory mechanism preventing premature motor output and a specific excitatory process pertaining to the intended movement. Interactions between these two mechanisms could account for our behavioral results.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Human beings are flexible actors, quite capable of changing intended plans of action to produce alternative behaviors. Imagine someone about to pick up the phone to call a friend. Their brain is involved in planning the actions of reaching, grasping, and transporting the handset. However, as they are about to execute their self-paced action, if the phone suddenly rings they might make the same action immediately as a reaction and not on the basis of their unfolding intention to call a friend. In such a situation, a functionally similar action to the one being internally prepared for self-paced execution must be made in response to an external stimulus.
Imagine now, a person driving a car about to slow down and park to go into a shop. They are engaged in an endogenous process of intending to maneuver and park the car by preparing to press the brake pedal and steer the car to the right, for example. However, just before they execute their intended actions, a child runs out from behind a wall into the space where they were going to park. All of a sudden, on the basis of this new sensory information, the driver has to act immediately by steering the opposite way, either braking hard or accelerating away from the danger zone. In this case, the actor has to change not only the timing of their actions but also the very actions themselves.
Although numerous experiments have investigated the ability to stop actions, most of these have used stop-signal and countermanding paradigms (Corneil and Elsley 2005; Coxon et al. 2006; Ito et al. 2003; Logan and Cowan 1984) . These paradigms estimate the time required to stop an eye or limb movement by delivering a stop signal at various latencies after a go signal. The process of stopping is typically considered as a race between activity underlying "go" processes and "stop" processes (e.g., Curtis et al. 2005) . Other studies have investigated the processes involved in switching between two or more stimulus-response mappings, i.e., replacing one action with another, for example, when one has to switch between executing saccades toward versus away from a stimulus in the antisaccade paradigm (Munoz and Everling 2004) . Such studies have highlighted the role of the frontal lobe, especially the lateral prefrontal cortex, in this process (e.g., Ford et al. 2005; Nyffeler et al. 2007 ). By contrast, other studies implicate posterior parietal regions in rapid alteration of behavior, for example, when the target of a reaching action switches from one location to another (Pisella et al. 2000) .
The current work aims to contribute to this literature on the mechanisms underlying flexible action by investigating the time course of modifying an intended action plan with regard to either the time of the action is made or the time and type of action made on the basis of sensory cues (for further discussion on the when and what components of intentional action, see Brass and Haggard 2008) . We are particularly interested in shedding light on the mechanisms involved in producing flexible behaviors that require an interaction between the systems involved in self-paced action generation and externally triggered action generation. Obhi and Haggard (2004) introduced the "truncation" paradigm to examine the functional relationship between the systems responsible for self-paced action and those responsible for externally triggered action. Briefly, there were two critical conditions: in the simple reaction time (SRT) condition, subjects were given a warning stimulus (WS) and told to react as quickly as possible to a tone that can occur at random times within a certain time window after the WS (e.g., 3-10 s after the WS). Reaction times (RTs) were recorded as the dependent measure. The other critical condition is the truncation condition. In this condition, subjects were again given a WS, but this time they were instructed to make an internally generated key press at a time of their own choosing again within a particular time window (i.e., the 3-to 10-s window as in SRT condition) after the WS. The critical manipulation was the occurrence of a tone, on a proportion of trials, in response to which subjects were instructed to make the very same key press as quickly as possible. Hence in this situation, the subject is internally preparing to press the key at a particular time but must then press the key as quickly as possible if a tone occurs and in so doing overrides their internal plans. On approximately half the trials, the subject actually made the internally generated key press prior to the tone and this terminates the trial. On the other half, the tone interrupts the internal preparation and subjects responded with the same key press. By comparing the RTs in the SRT condition to the RTs in the truncation trials where a tone interrupted the ongoing internal preparation, it was possible to elucidate the potential relationship between the systems underlying internally generated and externally triggered actions. The robust result is that the presence of internal preparation to make a key press makes subjects significantly slower than SRT levels when they have to respond to a beep with the same action they were internally preparing. Hence the systems involved in internally generated and externally triggered action must share at least some (limited) resources because engaging them together incurs a time cost. However, the two forms of action generation may also be somewhat qualitatively different because preparation for a self-initiated action does not facilitate production of the same action prompted by an external cue. The RT cost found in the truncation paradigm can be considered as an "RT cost of intention." Similar results have been reported recently by Obhi et al. (2009) .
The distinction between internally generated and externally triggered actions is sometimes controversial as clearly no action (other than simple reflexes) can be totally externally triggered. Here we operationalize this distinction as follows: internally generated actions are not made in response to an imperative external cue, whereas externally triggered actions are made immediately in response to an imperative external cue. This distinction fits with previous ideas from authors interested in these two classes of action (e.g., Passingham 1993) .
Several apparent criticisms can be leveled at the truncation paradigm thereby casting doubt on the existence of a real RT cost of intention. Most of these criticisms have been dealt with by Astor-Jack and Haggard (2005) in a comprehensive series of experiments that confirmed the RT cost as a robust phenomenon. Two important alternative explanations that were ruled out were the ideas that attentional focus might account for the cost and that the cost is due to attenuated processing of the external stimulus in the truncation condition (due to the participant dividing attention across their internal preparation and monitoring for the external stimulus). Briefly, in an eventrelated potential study, measurements of the N150 component in the SRT and truncation conditions suggested that perceptual processing of the (auditory) stimulus was not attenuated or substantially slowed in the truncation condition relative to the SRT condition. Hence the RT cost of intention is not thought to be due to slowed processing of the stimulus in truncation trials. In another study, the authors asked participants to either attend for the stimulus or attend to their internal preparatory process, and these differences in the allocation of attention also did not account for the cost (see Astor-Jack and Haggard 2005 for details). In a recent study, Obhi, Matkovich, and Gilbert (2009) replicated the RT cost and suggested that the cost is due to a process that switches between internal and external triggers for action. However, the precise locus of the cost in the chain of processing preceding action production remains unspecified to date.
The aim of experiment 1 was to extend the results of Obhi and Haggard (2004) and Obhi et al. (2009) by considering how the RT cost of intention unfolds over the course of a premovement planning period. That is, does the RT cost of intention change, or stay stable, over the course of planning a self-paced motor action? Furthermore, what does this tell us about the processes involved in motor planning and the processes involved in changing the temporal parameters of a motor plan in the light of incoming sensory information? For example, if the RT cost remains stable across the preparatory period, this might be indicative of inhibition applied to prepared motor plans to prevent early execution.
To address these issues, we used a paradigm similar to that of Obhi and Haggard (2004) except that in the present paradigm, we asked participants to prepare to move at a specific time after trial onset. In particular, we asked them to intend to press a key ϳ3 s after the onset of a trial. They were helped in this by the provision of an onscreen display showing the numbers 1-3 for 1-s durations. This differs from previous versions of the experiment in which participants were free to choose when to respond within a 3-to 10-s window post trial onset. On a related note, it also differs from previous experiments because the degree of self-pacing is almost certainly reduced, despite our instructions, on account of the provision of an onscreen display of scrolling numbers.
One criticism of this paradigm could be that it does not investigate internally generated versus externally triggered actions per se, but instead simply considers the processes involved when one has to change the time or type of a reaction unexpectedly. We took careful steps in instructing participants to plan to move intentionally and not reactively to avoid this problem.
Using the present paradigm, we were able to interrupt premovement processing at various (known) times within the 3-s preparatory period and compare the RTs elicited with those from an SRT condition with an identical foreperiod. We are confident that participants do actually prepare to move at a predetermined time and that we would be able to interrupt this process with an auditory tone. This confidence is justified by experiments in which a lateralized readiness potential is observed during the foreperiod of a simple RT task (e.g., Kutas and Donchin 1980) , reflecting the fact that participants do actually prepare for movement in the foreperiod.
In experiment 2, we changed the task for participants such that they internally prepared to make a right index finger key press at a specific time but were required to produce various actions in response to an external cue if the cue interrupted their internal preparation. The reason for this manipulation was to examine whether, if inhibition operates during preparation, it operates globally (i.e., all motor output is inhibited), or more specifically (either in a lateralized manner, or at an effector specific level). Specifically, in three different conditions, participants were instructed to produce 1) the same right index finger key press, the same condition as experiment 1, 2) a key press with their right middle finger (switching from an internally generated to an external triggered mode, and a change of effectors on the right hand), or 3) a key press with their left index finger, switching from an internally generated to an externally triggered mode and changing to a homologous effectors on the other hand.
The predictions for each of these conditions in terms of the RT cost are as follows: if the inhibition is general inhibition applied to all motor output during the preparatory period, then all conditions should produce RT costs of similar magnitudes (i.e., RT cost in 1 ϭ RT cost in 2 ϭ RT cost in 3). If, on the other hand, the inhibition is specific to the motor structures contralateral to the hand being prepared, RT costs should be greater for both right hand conditions compared with the left hand condition (RT cost in 1 ϭ RT cost in 2, and RT costs in 1 and 2 Ͼ RT cost in 3). Finally, if the inhibition is specific for the effector being prepared, then the RT cost should be greatest in the condition which does not require a switch between effectors (RT cost in 1 Ͼ RT cost in 2 and RT cost in 3).
M E T H O D S

Experiment 1
PARTICIPANTS. Thirteen right-handed subjects with a mean age of 22.5 Ϯ 1.9 yr (9 female, 4 male) participated in the experiment for monetary compensation. All subjects provided written informed consent, and procedures conformed to local ethical guidelines.
PROCEDURES. Subjects took part in three different experimental conditions all of which required making key presses. Subjects kept their right index finger on the "/" key of a keyboard (rewired to minimize scan time delays) and depressed it either in response to an external cue or as a result of their own intentional preparation. In the first intentional action condition, subjects were instructed before each trial to plan to make a key press at various times (in seconds) after the start of a trial. They were helped in this by an on-screen display which began immediately after the "trial starts" instruction for each trial. The display consisted of the numbers 1-5 presented individually in the center of the monitor for 1 s each. Subjects were instructed not to "react" to any of the numbers and that the numbers simply provided a guide to help them in their internal preparations. It was emphasized and stressed to subjects that they were to plan to make a key presses at a prespecified time after the start of the trial and not a reactive key press in response to anything on the screen. The exact time at which they were supposed to plan to move was specified at the start of each trial, via an onscreen instruction. Data from this condition were not analyzed.
In the SRT condition, subjects were instructed to respond as quickly as possible on hearing a beep after the trial starts cue. This condition was divided into five blocks of 40 trials. Beeps were delivered after delays of 200, 525, 850, 1,175, 1,500, 1,825, 2,150, 2,475, 2,800, or 3,000 ms post trial starts (see Fig. 1 ). Thus the 40 trials in each block comprised four trials for each of the 10 tone onset times. All 40 trials were randomized in all five blocks.
Finally, in the truncation condition, subjects were again instructed to plan and prepare to make a key press at a prespecified time. They were informed that on some trials a beep would occur and if it did, they were to respond with the same key press they were planning as quickly as possible (see Fig. 1 ). Hence, the truncation condition yielded two sets of trials; truncation intentional action trials (which were not analyzed) and truncation RT (TRT) trials, which were compared with SRT trials in the analysis, to determine the RT cost of changing the time of the action. Trials in the truncation condition were presented in five blocks of 88 trials, 40 of which involved beeps. In all 40 "beep" trials, subjects were instructed to plan to make a key press 3 s after the start of the trial (i.e., approximately at the time the "3" appeared on the monitor). The onset times of the beeps were identical to those used in the SRT condition. Each onset time was used four times per block. Thus an external stimulus interrupted participants' internal preparations at 10 discrete times during the premovement period, four times each per block. The remaining 48 trials in each block were presented solely to scatter trials involving beeps (i.e., to prevent subjects from expecting beeps). RTs from these 48 trials were not analyzed. Of these 48 trials, 40 required subjects to respond ϳ3 s after the WS and four each required subjects to respond ϳ2 s or after 1 s. Participants were instructed in the experiment via the provision of on-screen instructions at the start of each block and then via verbal explanation by the experimenter. The experimenter also reminded participants of their task periodically throughout each experimental block, These latter eight trials were included as "catch trials" to ensure subjects were following instructions. All 88 trials were randomized in all five blocks. Thus subjects could not accurately predict whether or not a beep would occur in a given trial.
To minimize fatigue, subjects were given a short break between blocks.
For the analysis, RTs from trials in the SRT condition were compared with TRT trials from the truncation condition. Trials from Note that in SRT condition participants are expecting a tone (hence labeled "expectancy") and in truncation conditions they are intending to make an intentional action 3 s after the warning stimulus (WS; hence labeled "intention").
the intentional action condition and the truncation internal action conditions were not analyzed (see Astor-Jack and Haggard 2005; Obhi and Haggard 2004; Obhi et al. 2009 for further details on this paradigm). RT differences between the SRT and TRT trials were then subjected to statistical analysis in the form of a 2 (truncation; SRT or truncation) ϫ 10 (interruption time, 200, 525, 850, 1, 175, 1, 500, 1, 825, 2, 150, 2, 475, 2, 800 , and 3,000 ms post trial onset) repeatedmeasures ANOVA.
Experiment 2
PARTICIPANTS. Twelve healthy subjects (24 Ϯ 2 yr, 8 females, 4 males) took part in the experiment for monetary compensation. The experiment was carried out in accordance with local ethics guidelines and informed consent was obtained from all participants.
PROCEDURE. The experiment consisted of seven blocks of trials quasi randomly arranged across participants to avoid order effects. Specifically, participants completed one intentional action block, three SRT blocks, and three truncation blocks. In intentional action blocks, participants simply prepared and executed a self paced action (right index finger key press on the "B" key) at 3 s post trial onset. These conditions served mainly to give participants experience in making self-paced motor actions and data from these conditions were not included in the main analysis. In the SRT blocks, participants responded with a right index finger response ("B" key), a right middle finger response ("N" key), or a left index finger response ("V" key) when an auditory tone was presented. The presentation of the tone was pseudo-randomly varied across times throughout a 0-to 3-s window post trial onset.
In the three truncation conditions, participants were required to prepare to make a self paced movement ϳ3 s post trial onset (see Fig. 2 ). As in experiment 1, there are two types of trials that can arise from this condition: trials in which the participant makes a self-paced action (truncation intentional action trials) and trials in which the participants internal preparation to act is interrupted by a tone (TRT trials). In all truncation blocks, participants were asked to prepare to make a right index finger key press on the "B" key at 3 s post trial onset. If their internal preparation was interrupted by an auditory tone, they were required to respond with either the same movement that they were internally preparing (a right index finger key press on the "B" key), a movement made from the same side of the body (a right middle finger key press on the "N" key), or a movement made by the left index finger-that is, an effector located on the opposite side of the body (a left index finger key press on the "V" key) as quickly as possible. Each block was preceded with instructions as to which of the three responses was to be executed if the tone interrupted internal preparation. Additionally, participants completed 15 practice truncation trials composed of five trials for each of the three truncation conditions. Participants were allowed to repeat the practice trials until they felt comfortable with the task and the experimenter agreed they were executing the task correctly.
Furthermore, to ensure that differences in foreperiods between SRT trials and TRT trials did not contribute to any differences in the RTs from these trials, the foreperiods from each participant's truncation condition were used as the foreperiods for the next participant's SRT blocks. Hence the foreperiods were precisely matched at the group level for these comparisons (see Obhi et al. 2009 for a similar approach).
In all conditions involving a reaction, a 100-ms 1-kHz auditory tone served as the stimulus. In accordance with a previous study (AstorJack and Haggard 2005), there were 20 trials in the SRT condition and the intentional action condition, and 40 trials in the truncation conditions based on the expectation that, in truncation conditions, approximately half the trials would be classified as intentional action trials in which the participant made their internally prepared, self-paced key press prior to the occurrence of the tone, and the other half would be trials in which the tone interrupted participants' internal preparations prompting them to respond with the preinstructed movement. All stimuli and RTs were recorded using DirectRT and custom response hardware, which provided timing precision of 1 ms.
R E S U L T S
Experiment 1
Data from one subject were not analyzed because the participant failed to follow instructions. For the SRT and truncation SRT trials, RTs were entered into a 2 (condition: SRT or truncation) ϫ 10 (interruption time: 10 levels) repeated-measures ANOVA. To facilitate comparison of RT costs to previous studies using similar paradigms (e.g., Astor-Jack and Haggard 2005; Obhi and Haggard 2004; Obhi et al. 2009 ), RTs were trimmed at 75 and 1,000 ms. This procedure resulted in a loss of 2% of trials.
As Fig. 3 clearly shows, there was a significant main effect of truncation, with TRTs being on average, greater than those Note that in SRT condition participants are expecting a tone (hence labeled "expectancy") and in truncation conditions they are intending to make an intentional action 3 s after the WS (hence labeled "intention").
in the SRT condition [F(1,11) ϭ 29.749, P Ͻ 0.0001]. In addition, as shown clearly in Fig. 3 there was a significant main effect of interruption time [F(1,11) ϭ 65.11, P Ͻ 0.0001].
There was also a significant truncation ϫ interruption time interaction [F(1,11) ϭ 15.950, P Ͻ 0.0001]. A series of Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons showed that for all but the last interruption time, RT in the truncation SRT condition was significantly greater than RT in the SRT condition (all tests, P Ͻ 0.05). Hence, there was an RT cost of intention for all but the last interruption time.
SIZE OF THE RT COST OF INTENTION ACROSS INTERRUPTION
TIMES. To better understand the progression of the RT cost of intention across the range of interruption times, RTs for SRT trials were subtracted from RTs from the truncation reaction trials for imperative stimuli occurring at each interruption time and a series of Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons was performed. These tests revealed that the last two interruption times yielded RT costs of intention that were significantly smaller than all preceding RT costs of intention.
Experiment 2
The same preprocessing and trimming criteria for RTs were used as for experiment 1. This procedure, in addition to removal of trials in which participants failed to follow instructions, resulted in loss of 3.42% of trials across all subjects. BREAKDOWN OF DATA. In the truncation condition in which a right index finger key press had to be made in response to a tone interrupting participants' preparation, 48% of trials were classified as truncation RT trials. Additionally, the percentage of truncation RT trials was 40% in the condition requiring participants to prepare a right index finger key press but make a right middle finger key press if their internal preparation was interrupted by a tone. Finally, when participants prepared to make a right index finger movement but made a left index finger movement if their internal preparation was interrupted by a tone, 42% of trials were classified as truncation RT trials.
COMPARISON BETWEEN THREE TRUNCATION CONDITIONS. To determine the specificity of the hypothesized inhibition a 3 ϫ 2 ANOVA with the factors effector (right index finger, right middle finger, left index finger) and condition (SRT, TRT) was performed. The test revealed a main effect for both effector and condition [F(2,10) ϭ 16.061, P ϭ 0.001 and F(1,11) ϭ 97.236, P Ͻ 0.0001, respectively]. Additionally, a significant interaction between effector and condition [F(2,10) ϭ 14.558, P ϭ 0.001] was also present (Fig. 4) .
COMPARISON OF TRUNCATION CONDITIONS TO EXTERNAL CONDI-
TIONS. On the basis of previous results (Astor-Jack and Haggard 2005; Obhi and Haggard 2004) , three planned paired samples t-tests were conducted to determine the difference in RT between each of the three SRT conditions and their respective truncation RT trials. Importantly, the foreperiods in the external conditions were matched to the appropriate truncation conditions. Thus we compared RTs across blocks in which both the time and order of tone presentation were the same. The first test revealed that when a right index finger movement was internally prepared and made in response to a tone, RTs were significantly greater than in the SRT condition [t(11) ϭ 5.386, P Ͻ 0.001]. This was also true for the condition in which a response with the right index finger was internally prepared, but a right middle finger key press was executed in response to a tone compared with the SRT condition involving the right middle finger response [t(11) ϭ 14.487, P Ͻ 0.001]. Likewise, when a right index finger movement was internally prepared and left index finger key press was executed in response to a tone, response times were significantly greater compared with the SRT condition involving a left index finger response [t(11) ϭ 7.833, P Ͻ 0.001]. Hence, in all three truncation conditions, there was a significant RT cost of intention. Figure 2 shows the SRT and TRT data from experiment 2.
COMPARISON OF THE THREE RT COSTS. To determine whether the sizes of the RT costs in the three truncation conditions differed, a series of planned comparisons were made between the three RT costs of intention. These tests showed that the average RT cost of switching from an internal to an external mode of response production was greater when the response required was different from the internally prepared response [t (11) was executed; t(11) ϭ 4.560, P ϭ 0.001 when a left index finger key press was executed]. Interestingly, there was not a significant difference between the RT costs when the right middle finger key press was executed compared with when the left index finger key press was executed [t(11) ϭ 0.005, P ϭ 0.957].
D I S C U S S I O N
In two experiments, we investigated the RT costs involved in switching from an internally generated action preparation process to an externally triggered mode of action production, both when the "switched to" action is the same as the one being internally prepared and when it is different. In experiment 1, we showed that the RT cost of intention develops early in the preparatory period and remains relatively stable until the last few hundred milliseconds before the intended time of action at which time it starts to reduce. Experiment 2 was performed to investigate the nature of the hypothesized inhibition that accompanies voluntary preparation to act. Specifically, subjects were involved in three experimental conditions (intentional action, SRT and truncation). Examination of the RT cost of intention (the difference between TRT trials and SRT trials), showed that, as in the original experiment of Obhi and Haggard (2004) and experiment 1 in the current paper, there was a significant RT cost of intention for the condition in which only a change in when action production was required. However, we extend previous results by showing that when a switch of time (i.e., when) and of type (i.e., what) is made, the RT cost of intention increases significantly. Furthermore, there is no difference in the RT cost of intention based on whether the type of action made in response to an interrupting tone requires a finger from the same hand or a finger from the opposite hand.
What mechanisms can account for the relatively stable RT cost across most of the preparatory period that significantly reduces ϳ200 ms prior to the intended time of movement in experiment 1? One possibility is that preparing to make an action at a predetermined time (i.e., 3 s after the start of the trial) requires limited capacity planning resources some of which may also be needed for making the action when prompted by the external stimulus. This is an interesting possibility and suggests that the brain treats internally generated and externally triggered actions as (at least partially) separate tasks even when they map onto the same motor output or activate the same "response channel" (e.g., Gratton et al. 1988 ). However, this explanation might also predict that as the presentation of the stimulus becomes closer to the predetermined time of movement, the RT cost in producing the action will increase. This suggestion is consistent with accumulator models of motor preparation that posit that activity in motor areas or response channels builds up over time, until it reaches a threshold, at which point the intended movement is released (e.g., Gratton et al. 1988; Stuphorn and Schall 2002) . By this view, as time of movement approaches, the amount of accumulated activation in the response channel will be greater and greater. When an externally cued action now has to be produced, requiring some of the same resources, the accumulated activation would have to dissipate before the reactive action can be initiated. Thus interruptions early in the planning period should yield smaller RT costs than those later in the foreperiod, which is not what we observe (see Astor-Jack and Haggard 2005 for an account of the RT cost along these lines). Therefore this explanation is likely to be incorrect.
Another potential mechanism that could explain the RT cost of intention is that the premotor systems responsible for selfinitiated action and externally cued action are mutually inhibitory. Specifically, it has been suggested that the supplementary motor area (SMA) and the lateral premotor cortex are involved in generating actions on the basis of internal drives and external cues respectively and that the pre-SMA is involved in movement inhibition (Chen et al. 2009; Giovanetti et al. 2005; Goldberg 1985; Goldberg and Bloom 1990; Haggard 2008; Passingham 1987 Passingham , 1993 Seitz et al. 2000) . During preparation of a self-initiated action, the SMA might inhibit the lateral premotor cortex, thus making it slower to prepare the movement on the basis of the perceptual cue. However, this proposed mechanism does not explain why the RT cost diminishes significantly ϳ200 ms prior to the intended time of movement.
In an attempt to explain the RT cost, we have recently suggested (Obhi et al. 2009 ) that there is a control process mediated by prefrontal cortical (PFC) areas, 1 possibly rostral PFC (approximating BA 10) which has been shown to be active when participants switch between processing perceptual cues and internally generated information (Burgess et al. 2007; Dumontheil et al. 2008 ). This prefrontal region has also been theorized to be responsible for managing more than one behavioral goal (e.g., Koechlin et al. 1999 Koechlin et al. , 2003 . Clearly in the current experiments, participants had to hold in mind the goal of acting intentionally, while maintaining the additional possibility of reacting to an external stimulus if delivered. We have previously suggested that switching between internally generated triggers and perceptual triggers may be a time-consuming process that could account for the RT cost of intention. This "trigger switch" explanation would predict stable RT costs throughout the preparatory period which is essentially what we observe (with the exception of the 200 ms or so prior to intended time of execution-which coincides with previously observed premovement increases in corticospinal excitability).
While the possibility of a trigger switch cost remains plausible, the alternative idea that motor output structures are inhibited during a preparatory period seems to fit well with neurophysiological data on motor preparation (e.g., McMillan et al. 2006; Sinclair and Hammond 2008) .
Given that previous studies have shown that decreases in RT as a function of "readiness to respond" are paralleled by elevated levels of corticospinal excitability (CSE) (Bestmann et al. 2008; van Elswijk et al. 2007 ), the literature focusing on levels of CSE during the foreperiod of motor preparation tasks may provide some clues as to potential mechanisms underlying the behavioral results in this paper. However, it is imperative to note that previous work in this area has not produced a solid consensus with regard to how CSE changes over a preparatory period. In view of this, and given that we did not directly measure CSE, a definitive identification of the mechanisms underlying the current behavioral results is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, our behavioral results must be mediated by some set of neurophysiological processes, and we devote the remainder of the paper to consideration of some (likely) possibilities.
In the motor preparation literature, one, as yet unresolved, issue relates to the levels of CSE in the foreperiod of an RT task. Whereas some studies have shown a suppression of CSE (measured via TMS of the prime mover representation) during this time (e.g., Davranche et al. 2007; Duque and Ivry 2009; Sinclair and Hammond 2008) when there is a high degree of certainty about which response will be made and when the response will be made, others have shown an increase in CSE (e.g., Bestmann et al. 2008) . While it is difficult to fully reconcile these results, on balance there appears to be a pattern showing suppression of CSE in the movement representation during the foreperiod, when predictability of what response and when the response will be made is high. The exact mechanisms causing the MEP suppression are not fully understood although it appears that changes in spinal excitability cannot be solely responsible (e.g., Hasbroucq et al. 1999; Touge et al. 1998) . Interestingly, Hammond (2008, 2009 ) reported a suppression of MEP amplitude in conjunction with a reduction in short interval intracortical inhibition (SICI). This pattern of evidence is highly suggestive of two mechanisms at play during motor preparation: one that acts to progressively release inhibition acting on the movement representation of the upcoming action and a suppression of MEP amplitude that reflects an (independent) corticospinal braking mechanism, preventing premature movement. We term the first mechanism the "specific facilitation of the prime mover" mechanism (SFPM) and the second mechanism the "prevention of early movement" mechanism (PEM).
In contrast to the MEP suppression findings in predictable tasks, there is also evidence of increased MEP amplitude during the foreperiod prior to a temporally unpredictable movement cue (van den Hurk et al. 2007 ). Based on these results, the authors suggested that when there is temporal uncertainty about when a response will be required, participants are able to prepare and then hold a motor response during a delay period of several seconds. These authors also observed a corresponding decrease in MEP amplitude for a muscle unrelated to the task. Other studies have also shown a decrease in MEP size in both the task-specific muscle and muscles not involved in the task (see Duque and Ivry 2009 for more on this). Thus it is plausible that there is a general suppression of motor output structures during motor preparation.
The suggestion that motor preparation is accompanied by an inhibitory process is not new. For example, Sinclair and Hammond (2009) have recently argued that "a warning signal induces automatic motor cortical activation which is balanced by a competing inhibition to prevent premature response" and Duque and Ivry (2009) also state that suppression of MEPs in the foreperiod indexes an impulse control mechanism preventing premature movement. In view of this possibility and to further investigate the hypothesized inhibition (and in particular to what extent it might operate at local or global levels), we performed experiment 2 in which participants switched from an internal to an external mode of action production in situations when the "switched to" action was the same or different from the internally prepared action. We found that switching to a different action led to an increased RT cost compared with switching between internal and external triggers for the same action, and this increase was the same regardless of whether the switched to action involved an effector from the same side of the body or the opposite side. This equivalent cost for response alternatives on different sides of the body is suggestive of a general inhibition of all motor output. This is supported by findings showing depressed CSE in the prime mover and muscle representations unrelated to the upcoming movement in the foreperiod (e.g., Duque and Ivry 2009; Duque et al. 2005; Leocani et al. 2000) . It is this balancing act between hypothesized global inhibition of motor output structures and task-related specific removal of inhibition that seems to be operating during motor preparation and that could account for the results in the present study.
How exactly can these findings inform our conclusions? In experiment 1, the PEM mechanism would be operating along with some degree of SFPM. As long as general inhibition outweighs specific facilitation, (i.e., PEM dominates SFPM), an RT cost is predicted. Our results suggest that PEM dominates for most of the preparatory period, such that any response cued during this time is subject to execution delays. However, in the last few hundred milliseconds prior to the intended time of movement, PEM diminishes and the SFPM mechanism starts to dominate that results in faster responses toward the end of the preparatory period. Another neurophysiological result that supports our results is the fact that MEPs actually increase in amplitude ϳ200 ms or so prior to the movement (Chen et al. 1998 ; also see Davranche et al. 2007; Sinclair and Hammond 2009 for neurophysiological data supporting the idea that inhibition is removed as time preparation unfolds). In experiment 2, PEM could operate, again in conjunction with SFPM. Here, however, the presence of SFPM for the intended movement but not for (or at least to a lesser extent for) the unintended alternatives, would predict the pattern of RT costs that we observe (smaller RT costs in the truncation condition not involving a change of what movement is made).
Although we believe our results are informative for models of flexible action, one potential criticism pertains to the way in which we cast our experiments. Specifically, we characterized our studies in the context of changing from an intended movement plan to a same/different reactive movement. While this may be the case, as mentioned in the INTRODUCTION, it is possible to conceive of similar situations that involve changing the time or type of pending reactions. That is, there are potential parallels between our paradigm and paradigms in which participants prepare to make one response at an expected time, but actually are cued to make a different response at a different (unpredictable) time. In order to fully differentiate between these two conceptualizations of the tasks used in the current experiments, future experiments should include a control condition in which an imperative stimulus is also included for the "intentional" task. Thus, while we are quite safe in considering our work to relate to flexible action, we point out that further experiments are needed to confirm that the contexts in the current experiments are conceptually different to those involving only (expected) reactive movements.
To sum up, we have shown that intention to move slows the production of the same movement in response to an intervening cue and that this slowing is greater for movements that are different from the intended movement. The pattern of RT costs in experiment 1 casts doubt on the idea that accumulated internally generated motor preparation is dismantled prior to reactive processing occurring. Rather our results support recent ideas that preparation for voluntary action is accompanied by competing excitatory and inhibitory mechanisms applied to various motor representations. The exact manner in which such mechanisms operate remains to be clarified. Finally, we believe that the current paradigm is useful for assessing the mechanisms underlying flexible motor behavior, as well as enabling effective experimental manipulation of critical when and what components of intended actions (Brass and Haggard 2008) . 
